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The motivation of this thesis is to contribute to the improvement of the physical-layer secrecy
and privacy of wireless communication. Firstly, the rate and power adaptation technique is inves-
tigated to improve the energy efficiency of the physical-layer secrecy. We present the optimum rate
and power adaptation rule that maximizes the average secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) subject to
an average transmission power constraint. The SEE is defined as the outage secrecy capacity, the
largest secrecy rate, such that the outage probability is less than a certain value, divided by the
total power consumption (bits per joule). We also characterize the SEE gain provided by varying
the rate and/or the power, and discuss the impact of the number of antennas on the optimum
adaptation rule. Secondly, the joint impact of imperfect knowledge of the channel gain (channel
uncertainty) and noise power (noise uncertainty) at the adversary is investigated to improve the
physical-layer privacy. We characterize the covert throughput gain provided by the channel un-
certainty as well as the covert throughput loss caused by the channel fading as a function of the
noise uncertainty. We also show the impact the channel uncertainty on the total detection error
probability and the covert throughput. Our result shows that the channel fading is crucial to hiding
the signal transmission, particularly when the noise uncertainty is low and/or the receive SNR is
high. The impact of the channel uncertainty on the total detection error probability and the covert
throughput is more significant when the noise uncertainty is larger. Finally, hiding a covert (pri-
vate) message in non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) systems by superimposing (embedding)
it under other messages is proposed. We determine the total detection error probability (sum of
false alarm and missed detection probability), the adversary’s optimum detection strategy that
minimizes the total detection error probability, and the communicator’s optimum message hiding
strategy that maximizes the total detection error probability. Additionally, we explore exploiting
the channel variations to further increase the total detection error probability. We show that the
xi
total detection error probability increases and converges to 1 as the number of users increases and
that the total detection error probability, hence the covert rate, can be increased by increasing the
transmission power when the channel variation is exploited.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
A tremendously increasing demand of confidential and private data transmission has made
security a pivotal issue in the current wireless system network. In tradition, security is realized
by cryptography technique using secret key [47]. However, the cryptography technique has showed
vulnerable to secure information as it relies on assumption of infinite computational capability
at the adversary. It also requires high computational complexity and bandwidth and significant
challenges to secret key distribution and management in large-scale decentralized wireless network
has been recently addressed in [42]. Therefore, physical-layer security (also known as information-
theoretic security) has become attracted as an alternative security solution or additional layer of
security [53].
While many studies address security in physical layer by limiting information leaked to the
adversary [10], a.k.a secret communication, the threat to users’ privacy from the discovery of the
existence of the message has not been mitigated. Covert or low probability of detection commu-
nication is crucial to protect user privacy and provide a strong security. It has great implications
for many practical applications ranging from covert military and national security operations to
privacy protection for users of commercial wireless networks. In this chapter, we, therefore, present
the overview and recent works of both secret communication and covert communication. We also
mention our contributions and organization of the thesis.
1.1 Secret communication
1.1.1 Principle of secrecy
The principle of secret communication was established by Wyner as a single-input single-output
single-antenna eavesdropper (SISOSE) model [65] in Fig. 1.1. The source transmits a confidential
message W to legitimate receiver in the presence of eavesdropper. The message W is encoded into
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n symbols presented as an n-vector Xn. Y n and Zn denote the the received signals at the legitimate
receiver and eavesdropper, respectively. As Shannon’s notation, a perfect secrecy requires
I(W,Zn) = 0, (1.1)
where I(W,Zn) denotes the mutual information between W and Zn. Different from Shannon,
Wyner introduced the wiretap code (Rb, Rs), where Rb =
1
nH(X
n) is the transmission rate and
Rs =
1
nH(W ) is the confidential information rate, and the notion of secrecy as
1
n
I(W,Zn) = 0. (1.2)
Wyner showed that the secrecy exists only if the wiretap channel between source and eavesdropper
is a degraded version of the main channel between source and the legitimate receiver.
Figure 1.1 The wiretap channel of Wyner [65].
Later, Csiszar and Korner in [19] characterized the secrecy capacity for the case where the main
and wiretap channels are independent as
Cs = max
V→X→Y Z
I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z), (1.3)
where V is an input variable. [19] also proved that there exist channel codes guaranteeing both
robustness to transmission errors and a prescribed degree of data confidentiality. Then, in [38], the
secrecy capacity under AWGN channels is characterized as
Cs = [Cb − Ce]+, (1.4)
where Cb and Ce denote the capacity of the main channel and the wiretap channel, respectively.
Thereby, to achieve a positive secrecy capacity, it is required in (1.4) that the quality of main
channel is better than that of wiretap channel.
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1.1.2 Recent Works
The performance of secret communication can be measured in terms of the secrecy throughput,
which is the capacity of conveying information to the intended users while keeping it confidential
from eavesdroppers. There are two well-known secrecy measurements, namely, ergodic secrecy
capacity in fast fading [41, 40] and secrecy outage capacity in slow fading [11].
Recent techniques in secret communication can be listed as
1. Rate and power adaptation for maximizing the average secrecy capacity was presented in [27].
More specifically, [27] concerned the joint rate and power adaptation transmission scheme
for the fast fading in order to maximize the ergodic secrecy rate subject to average power
constraint.
2. Artificial Noise (AN) degrading the ability of the eavesdropper to intercept the signal destined
for the intended recipient was proposed in [25]. AN systems use a fraction of power to
transmit data (information) and allocate the remaining power to transmit AN. The high-
SNR performance of this type of technique was shown to be nearly optimal [35], and the
optimal power allocation between the information signal and AN was examined in [75]. The
optimal power allocation between the information signal and AN that maximizes the secrecy
throughput have been analyzed in [73, 67, 66]. While the traditional AN is designed based
on mutiple antennas at transmitter, an injection AN scheme for single-antenna transmitter
has been proposed in [30].
3. Cooperative and jamming relay was studied in [62]. Also, interference channels, multiple
access channels or multi-user broadcast channels for secrecy is also studied in [62, 49].
4. Since the secrecy performance heavily relies on the level of CSI knowledge at transmitter,
receiver and adversary, some strategies proposed for pilot training transmission to prevent
CSI leaked to the adversary has been considered in [43] via the reverse training strategy in a
time division duplex system, i.e. pilot transmitted at the legitimate receiver.
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For the slow fading, to better assist the system design, an revised secrecy outage formula were
developed in [77] to distinguish the security and reliability. [77] also analyzed the fixed rate fixed
power transmission scheme that maximizes the average secrecy throughput subject to delay and
fixed average secrecy outage probability constraints. [24] proved the optimal beamforming that
maximizes the instantaneous secrecy rate and then, derived the maximum instantaneous secrecy
rate subject to a fixed secrecy outage probability constraint. Next, the joint rate and power
adaptation strategy that maximizes the average secrecy throughput subject to fixed secrecy outage
probability and average power constraints is studied in [48] for the single antenna case. Finally, the
AN scheme with variable rate and variable power allocation between the information signal and
AN transmission that maximizes the average secrecy throughput subject to fixed secrecy outage
probability has also been analyzed in [73, 67, 66].
1.1.3 Secrecy Energy Efficiency
As energy use and costs for communications continue to rise, the energy efficiency of secret
communications, called secrecy energy efficiency (SEE), is emerging as another important figure-
of-merit. SEE is determined by the number of reliably and securely transmitted bits per unit energy
(bits/Joule). In recent years, several studies have been conducted to maximize the SEE which can
be defined in different ways. In [17], the SEE is defined as the outage secrecy capacity (b/s) divided
by the power consumption, while in [33, 71, 70], it is defined as the secrecy capacity (b/s) divided
by the power consumption and in [50] as the average outage secrecy capacity divided by the average
power consumption. Authors in [17, 33] developed iterative power control algorithms for maximizing
the instantaneous SEE. [71] determined the optimal transmit power and beamforming vector that
maximizes the instantaneous SEE depending on the availability of channel state information of the
eavesdropper. [70] developed a power control algorithm that maximizes the ergodic SEE by means
of fractional programming and sequential convex optimization tools. [50] developed an iterative
resource allocation algorithm for maximizing the SEE in OFDMA system. In addition, the impact
of artificial noise on the SEE is analyzed in [70, 50].
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Although the rate and power adaptation strategy has been considered in secrecy, it has not
been done in secrecy energy efficiency. In the chapter 2, we, therefore, consider joint rate and
power adaptation for maximizing secrecy energy efficiency under the constraint of secrecy outage
and average transmission power.
1.2 Covert communication
1.2.1 Covert communication under channel uncertainty and noise uncertainty
The broadcast nature of the wireless medium allows wireless networks to be easily monitored,
which creates a serious concern about the privacy of wireless communications. The vast majority
of research in the past has focused on protecting the message content through cryptography [52] or
physical-layer security [10]. While these approaches address security in many domains by protecting
the content of the message, they do not mitigate the threat to users’ privacy from the discovery
of the existence of the message. Covert or low probability of detection communication is crucial
to protect user privacy and provide a strong security. It has great implications for many practical
applications ranging from covert military and national security operations to privacy protection for
users of commercial wireless networks.
Covert communication is governed by the square root law (SRL): O(
√
N) bits can be reliably
transmitted in N channel uses without being detected by the adversary; transmission of more bits
results in either detection or uncorrectable decoding errors. The SRL was first proven for the
classical wireless channels subject to the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) [9], with follow-on
works extending this result to discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) and fully characterizing the
constant hidden by the Big-O notation [15, 12, 64].
Other extensions have attempted to identify scenarios in which the SRL may be overcome. For
instance, authors in [61] showed that robust detection of signal transmission is impossible, even if
the detector takes an infinite number of samples, if the detector’s signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is
below a threshold, known as the SNR wall [61]. This SNR wall, caused by the inherent mismatch
between the true noise power and its estimate, called noise uncertainty, can be leveraged to hide the
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signal transmission. In the realistic situation of uncertain knowledge of the noise power, a positive
covert rate, i.e. reliable transmission of O(N) bits in N channel uses, is possible while guaranteeing
that the adversary cannot detect the signal transmission [36, 37]. The idea of exploiting the noise
uncertainty was extended to jamming the adversary by varying the power [59]. Most recently,
[31] has examined the impact of noise uncertainty on covert communication by considering two
practical uncertainty models. Other works have analyzed covert communication under block fading
channels, where users experience uncertainty about their channel knowledge [57].
In the chapter 3, we, therefore, analyze the joint impact of imperfect knowledge of the channel
gain (channel uncertainty) and noise power (noise uncertainty) at the adversary on the total detec-
tion error probability (sum of the probability of false alarm and missed detection) and the covert
throughput in Rayleigh fading channel. We determine the optimum detection threshold for the en-
ergy detector that minimizes the total detection error probability as a function of the channel gain
estimate. Then, we determine the maximum allowed transmission power for the total detection
error probability to be no less than a threshold. Based on this, we determine the maximum aver-
age transmission rate (bits/s/Hz) subject to a covert communication constraint, hereafter referred
to as the covert throughput. We characterize the covert throughput gain provided by imperfect
knowledge of the channel gain and noise power at the adversary and the covert throughput loss
caused by the channel fading as a function of the noise uncertainty.
1.2.2 Covert non-orthogonal multiple access
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) allows users to share the same spectrum and thus is
envisaged to address high spectral efficiency challenge in the fifth generation (5G) networks. In
[21], the authors investigated the spectrum efficiency of NOMA and its potential gain over the
conventional orthogonal multiple access (OMA). An extension to multiple input multiple output
(MIMO) was considered in [60]. More recently, the secrecy aspects of NOMA systems have been
studied. The secrecy sum rate has been investigated for single input single output NOMA [29, 74]
and multiple antenna NOMA [39, 45]. However, to the best of our knowledge, the privacy aspect
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of NOMA has not been studied. Covert or low probability of detection (LPD) communication is
crucial to protect user privacy and provide a strong security for many practical applications ranging
from military and national security operations to privacy protection for users of commercial wireless
networks.
Recent study of covert communication has considered embedding the covert signal into an
existing non-covert transmission [5, 32]. More specifically, an information theoretic analysis of
embedding the covert signal in an innocent signal transmission has been developed in [5]. This
work is motivated by [23] where a dirty constellation (hardware imperfection) is exploited to hide
the transmission of information. Other work considered covertly sending a covert message in
amplify-and-forward relay network while forwarding the source message to the destination [32].
Although the secrecy has been heavily studied in NOMA system, there is no prior work considering
the privacy (covertness) aspect of NOMA system.
In the chapter 4, we, therefore, study the privacy (covertness) aspect of NOMA system. The
covert message is superimposed onto K non-covert (public) messages in NOMA system such that
the total transmission power remains the same whether or not the covert message is transmitted.
We show that the covert message can be detected only when the non-covert message, where the
covert message is superimposed onto, can be decoded. This suggests hiding the covert message
under the non-covert message that is most difficult to decode. Hence, the effectiveness of hiding
the covert message can be improved by exploiting the multiplicity of users in NOMA system. We
determine the total detection error probability (sum of false alarm and missed detection probability)
as a function of the number of users in Rayleigh fading channel. We show that it increases and
converges to 1 as the number of non-covert users increases. This means that the covert transmission
is undetectable if the number of non-covert users is sufficiently large. We also show that the total
detection error probability can be increased as the transmit power is increased, thereby increasing
the covert rate, by adapting the superposition rule to the channel variations.
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1.3 Thesis Contributions and Organizations
The contributions are organized as follows
• In chapter 2, we present the optimum rate and power adaptation rule that maximizes the
average SEE subject to an average power constraint. We compare the average SEE provided
by the optimum rate and power adaptation with that provided by three suboptimal trans-
mission rules: variable rate on-off transmission, variable rate fixed power transmission, and
fixed rate variable power transmission. We characterize the SEE gain provided by varying
the rate and/or the power, and discuss the impact of the number of antennas and the circuit
power consumption on the optimum adaptation rule.
• In chapter 3, we show that the channel fading is crucial to hiding the signal transmission,
particularly when the noise uncertainty is low and/or the receive SNR is high. We determine
the optimum detection threshold for the energy detector that minimizes the total detection
error probability as a function of the channel gain estimate. Then, we determine the maximum
allowed transmission power for the total detection error probability to be no less than a
threshold. Based on this, we determine the maximum average transmission rate (bits/s/Hz)
subject to a covert communication constraint, hereafter referred to as the covert throughput.
We characterize the covert throughput gain provided by imperfect knowledge of the channel
gain and noise power at the adversary and the covert throughput loss caused by the channel
fading as a function of the noise uncertainty. Our analysis shows that the channel fading is
crucial to hiding the signal transmission, particularly when the noise uncertainty is low and/or
the receive SNR is high. The impact of the channel uncertainty on the total detection error
probability and the covert throughput is particularly noticeable when the noise uncertainty
is large. The channel uncertainty provides a covert throughput gain of 12% ∼ 19% over the
case that perfect channel knowledge is available at the adversary when the noise uncertainty
is in the range of 1 ∼ 2 dB. However, if the noise uncertainty is small, the channel uncertainty
does not help much increase the total detection error probability and the covert throughput.
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• In chapter 4, we study the physical-layer privacy (covertness) in NOMA system. The covert
message is superimposed onto K non-covert (public) messages in NOMA system such that the
total transmission power remains the same whether or not the covert message is transmitted.
We show that the covert message can be detected only when the non-covert message, where
the covert message is superimposed, can be decoded. This suggests hiding the covert message
under the non-covert message that is most difficult to decode. Hence, the effectiveness of
hiding the covert message can be improved by exploiting the multiplicity of users in NOMA
system. We determine the total detection error probability (sum of false alarm and missed
detection probability) as a function of the number of users in Rayleigh fading channel. We
show that it increases and converges to 1 as the number of non-covert users increases. This
means that the covert transmission is undetectable if the number of non-covert users is suffi-
ciently large. We also show that the total detection error probability can be increased as the
transmit power is increased, thereby increasing the covert rate, by adapting the superposition
rule to the channel variations.
The remainder of this report is organized as follows
• Chapter 2 considers the problem of adapting power and rate to maximize the secrecy energy
efficiency.
• Chapter 3 studies joint impact of imperfect knowledge of the channel gain and noise power
on the detection error probability at the adversary and the covert throughput in Rayleigh
fading channel.
• Chapter 4 studies the physical-layer privacy (covertness) in NOMA system.
• Chaper 5 concludes this work and outline the main contributions. Future work is also pre-
sented.
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CHAPTER 2. ADAPTING RATE AND POWER FOR MAXIMIZING
SECRECY ENERGY EFFICIENCY
In this chapter, we present the optimum rate and power adaptation rule that maximizes the
average SEE subject to an average power constraint, where the SEE is defined as the outage
secrecy capacity divided by the power consumption (bits per Joule). We compare the average
SEE provided by the optimum rate and power adaptation with that provided by three suboptimal
transmission rules: variable rate on-off transmission, variable rate fixed power transmission, and
fixed rate variable power transmission. We characterize the SEE gain provided by varying the rate
and/or the power, and discuss the impact of the number of antennas on the optimum adaptation
rule.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the system model. Section
2.2 derives secrecy outage capacity. Section 2.3 develops the adaptive power and rate transmission
scheme and derives the average secrecy-energy efficiency. Section 2.6 shows the numerical results
and section 2.7 concludes the chapter.
2.1 System Model
We consider sending secret information from a transmitter (Alice) equipped with N antennas
to a receiver (Bob) equipped with one antenna in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve) equipped
with one antenna. The transmitted signal vector is given by
x = wu, (2.1)









denotes the complex circularly symmetric Gaussian random variable
with mean m and variance σ2.
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The received signals at Bob and Eve are given by
yB = h
Tx + nB = h
Twu+ nB (2.2)
yE = g
Tx + nE = g
Twu+ nE , (2.3)









denotes the channel gain vector between Alice and Eve, and nB and nE denote
the complex Gaussian noise at Bob and Eve, respectively. We assume nB and nE are independent
with mean zero and variance σ2n.
We assume that both the main channel (Alice to Bob) and the eavesdropper’s channel (Alice to
Eve) are quasi-static fading channels. That is, the fading coefficients, albeit random, are constant
during the transmission of an entire codeword and independent from codeword to codeword. This
corresponds to a situation where the coherence time of the channel is large. We assume that Bob
has perfect knowledge of h from the pilot signal sent by Alice and that h is fedback to Alice for
adaptation. We also assume that Eve has perfect knowledge of h and g. These assumptions are
realistic for the slow-fading wireless environment under consideration.
2.2 Outage Secrecy Capacity













Since |gTw|2 has exponential distribution with mean σ2g , the outage probability for a given secrecy
rate RS is

























This is the probability that secrecy condition, which depends on g, is not satisfied because Alice
does not know g and thus, her transmission is independent of g.













where [·]+ := max(·, 0). The largest secrecy rate RS(h,w) such that PO(h,w) < ε is called outage
secrecy capacity.

















1 + γP (γ)




where γ := ‖h‖2 γ̄ is the instantaneous received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at Bob, P (γ) = σ2u/P
is the power adaptation rule, and γ̄ := P/σ2n is the average transmit SNR. The probability density




, γ ≥ 0, (2.13)




2.3 Secrecy Energy Efficiency



















where B is the bandwidth, PC is the circuit power and µ is the power amplifier efficiency. The
circuit power, PC , is given by NPA + PB, where PA is the circuit power consumption per antenna
and PB is the basic circuit power used by the transmitter [51]. Therefore, the instantaneous SEE
is maximized when w = h∗/‖h‖, which yields








PC + P · P (γ)/µ
, (2.16)





2.4 Variable Rate Variable Power Transmission
In this section, we determine the optimum power adaptation rule that maximizes the average
















P (γ) f (γ) dγ ≤ 1. (2.18)
Since ζ(P (γ), γ) is a ratio of strictly concave function and positive affine function for γ > α,
ζ(P (γ), γ) is a strictly pseudo-concave function of P (γ) for γ > α [14]. Hence, there should exist
a unique maxima. Let P ∗(γ) denote the power adaptation rule that maximizes the instantaneous




























for γ > α1.
1) E[P ∗(γ)] ≤ 1: If E[P ∗(γ)] ≤ 1, then the optimal power adaptation rule, PPR(γ), that
maximizes the average SEE, ζ, is equal to P ∗(γ).
2) E[P ∗(γ)] > 1: If E[P ∗(γ)] > 1, then PPR(γ) should be in the range of [0, P
∗(γ)]. This is
because E[PPR(γ)] > 1, hence (2.18) is not satisfied, if PPR(γ) > P
∗(γ). It can be shown that
∂2ζ(P (γ), γ)/∂P (γ)2 < 0 for P (γ) ∈ [0, P ∗(γ)] and γ > α. Hence, the optimization problem in
(2.17) can be solved by convex optimization.
Theorem: The solution of the optimization problem in (2.17) under the constraints of (2.18)





0 ≤ λ ≤ B(γ − α)/(PC ln 2)
λ > B(γ − α)/(PC ln 2),
(2.20)
























The proof of (2.20) is provided in Appendix A.
Since ζ(P (γ), γ) is strictly concave and has a unique maxima, it is an increasing function of
P (γ) for P (γ) ∈ [0, P ∗(γ)]. Therefore, λ is determined from the average power constraint:∫ ∞
0
PPR (γ) f (γ) dγ = 1. (2.22)
3) Summary: From 1) and 2), the optimal power adaptation rule, PPR(γ), that maximizes the






E[P ∗(γ)] ≤ 1
E[P ∗(γ)] > 1, 0 ≤ λ ≤ B(γ−α)PC ln 2
E[P ∗(γ)] > 1, λ > B(γ−α)PC ln 2 .
(2.23)
1Since ζ(P (γ), γ) is 0 for γ ≤ α, P ∗(γ) should be 0 for γ ≤ α to save the power.
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Then, the theoretical limit of the average SEE provided by the variable rate variable power









PC + P · P (γ)/µ
f (γ) dγ. (2.24)
2.5 Suboptimal Adaptive Transmissions
In this section we present three suboptimal, but simpler, adaptive transmission schemes which
are special cases of the variable rate variable power transmission.
2.5.1 Variable Rate On-Off Transmission














where P ∗OR = arg max
POR
∫∞




(n−1)! du. The average SEE









PC + P · POR(γ)/µ
f (γ) dγ. (2.26)
2.5.2 Variable Rate Fixed Power Transmission













PC + P · PR(γ)/µ
f(γ)dγ. (2.28)
2.5.3 Fixed Rate Variable Power Transmission
For a fixed transmission rate, i.e. RS(γ) = RS for all γ, the maximum allowed transmission





γ−α2RS , γ > α2
RS
0, γ ≤ α2RS ,
(2.29)
























for arbitrarily small δ > 0 and Γ (n, x) :=
∞∫
x
tn−1e−tdt = (n− 1)!Q(n, x). The average SEE of the





B ·RSf (γ) dγ
PC + P · PP (γ) /µ
. (2.32)
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Figure 2.1 Average secrecy energy efficiency versus average transmit power P ; N = 4 and
ε = 0.1.
2.6 Numerical Results
This section provides numerical results to evaluate the SEE of various adaptation schemes. The
parameters are chosen from GSM-1900 in micro-cell environment [63]: d = 1Km, PA = 0.36W,
17











































Figure 2.2 Average secrecy energy efficiency versus ε; P = −10dB.





−(34.53+38 log10(d))/10, µ = 0.4 and σ2n = NfN0B, where Nf = 3dB (noise
figure), N0 = −174dBm/Hz and B = 200KHz.
Fig. 2.1 depicts the average SEE of various adaptive transmission schemes versus the average
transmit power, P . One observes that the average SEE is limited if only the transmission power is
adapted (see ζP ): the rate adaptation is essential in order to maximize the average SEE. In fact, at
high transmit power, the additional gain provided by adapting the transmission power is negligible
if the transmission rate is adapted (compare ζPR vs. ζR). However, at low transmit power, the
power adaptation provides an additional gain even if the rate is adapted (compare ζPR vs. ζR).
Fig. 2.2 depicts the average SEE of various adaptive transmission schemes versus the number of
antennas at the transmitter, N , for different secrecy outage probability constraints. One observes
that the highest average SEE that can be provided by adapting both the transmission rate and
power can be achieved by adapting either of them if the number of antennas at the transmitter is
sufficiently large. One also observes that there exists an optimal number of transmit antennas that
maximizes the average SEE. This follows from the diminishing gain in the secrecy rate and linearly
increasing circuit power consumption as N increases.
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2.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we determined the optimum rate and power adaptation rule that maximizes
the average SEE subject to an average transmission power constraint. We found that the average
SEE is limited if only the transmission power is adapted: the rate adaptation is essential in order
to maximize the average SEE. In fact, at high transmit power, the additional gain provided by
adapting the transmission power is negligible if the transmission rate is adapted. However, at low
transmit power, the power adaptation provides an additional gain even if the rate is adapted. We
also found that the highest average SEE provided by adapting both the transmission rate and power
can be achieved by adapting either of them if the number of transmitter’s antennas is sufficiently
large.
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CHAPTER 3. COVERT COMMUNICATION UNDER CHANNEL
UNCERTAINTY AND NOISE UNCERTAINTY
In this chapter, we analyze the joint impact of imperfect knowledge of the channel gain (channel
uncertainty) and noise power (noise uncertainty) at the adversary on the total detection error
probability and the covert throughput in Rayleigh fading channel. We characterize the covert
throughput gain provided by the channel uncertainty as well as the covert throughput loss caused
by the channel fading as a function of the noise uncertainty. Our result shows that the channel
fading is crucial to hiding the signal transmission, particularly when the noise uncertainty is low
and/or the receive SNR is high. The impact of the channel uncertainty on the total detection error
probability and the covert throughput is more significant when the noise uncertainty is larger.
The remaining part of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes the system
model. Section 3.2 describes the detection strategy and the covert requirement. Section 3.3 derives
the optimum detection threshold that minimizes the total detection error probability. Section 3.4
derives the covert throughput and characterizes the covert throughput loss caused by the channel
fading and the covert throughput gain provided by the channel uncertainty as a function of the
noise uncertainty. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.1 System Model
Consider a scenario where Alice tries to send her message x[n], n = 1, 2, · · · , N , covertly to Bob
without being detected by a warden, Willie. The system model is illustrated in Fig.3.1. We assume
that Alice, Bob and Willie have single antenna. The received signal at Willie is given by
yW [n] =
 vW [n], H0g√Px[n] + vW [n], H1, (3.1)
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where H0 denotes the hypothesis of no transmission, H1 denotes the hypothesis of transmission,
g ∼ CN(0, σ2g) is the channel gain between Alice and Willie, P is the transmit power, and vW [n] ∼




Figure 3.1 Alice attempts to transmit covertly to Bob in the presence of an adversary,
Willie, who wants to detect Alice’s transmission.
We assume that Willie has an imperfect estimation of the channel gain (channel uncertainty).
Willie’s estimation of the channel gain and the estimation error are denoted by ĝ and g̃, respectively.
Thus,
g = ĝ + g̃, (3.2)
where ĝ and g̃ are independent complex Gaussian random variables with mean zero and variance
(1 − β)σ2g and βσ2g , respectively, and β ∈ [0, 1] represents the channel gain uncertainty. The
assumption of Gaussian distributed estimation error arises from using the MMSE estimator [34].
We further assume that Willie has imperfect knowledge of the noise power (noise uncertainty).
Noise uncertainty arises due to temperature change, environment noise change, or calibration error
[58]. We consider the bounded uncertainty model, where the actual noise power σ2w lies in a finite
range around the nominal (estimated) noise power, σ̂2w. We assume that σ
2
w,dB = 10 log10 σ
2
w is
uniformly distributed in its uncertainty range [σ̂2w,dB−ρdB, σ̂2w,dB +ρdB], where σ̂2w,dB = 10 log10 σ̂2w
and ρdB denotes the noise uncertainty deviation [58]. Then, the probability density function (PDF)
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w ≤ σ2w ≤ ρσ̂2w,
0, otherwise,
(3.3)
where ρ = 10ρdB/10.
3.2 Willie’s Detection Strategy and Covert Requirement
Willie is interested in knowing whether Alice transmits or not based on the observation vector
yW = (yW [1], ..., yW [N ]). The test statistic for detection
1 is given by [59]










where λ is the detection threshold. If Willie is allowed to observe an infinite number of samples,
which minimizes the total detection error probability, the test statistic converges to





|g|2P + σ2w, H1.
(3.6)
Given ĝ, the probability of false alarm and that of missed detection are given by
PF = Pr(T (yW ) > λ|H0) (3.7)
= Pr(σ2w > λ) (3.8)
and
PM = Pr(T (yW ) < λ|H1) (3.9)
= Pr(|ĝ + g̃|2P + σ2w < λ), (3.10)
respectively. Hence, the total detection error probability, PM + PF , is given by
ξ(ĝ) = PF + PM (3.11)
= 1− Pr(λ− |ĝ + g̃|2P < σ2w < λ) (3.12)
1It prior knowledge of the transmitter signal is unknown, the optimal detector is the energy detector [55].
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as N → ∞. Willie attempts to choose the optimum detection threshold, λ∗, that minimizes the




We consider Alice achieving covert communication if, for any ε > 0, a communication scheme
exists so that Eĝ[minλ(PF + PM )] ≥ 1 − ε as N → ∞. Here, ε signifies the covert requirement,
since a sufficiently small ε renders any detector employed at Willie to be ineffective.
3.3 Optimum Detection Threshold and Minimum total detection error
probability
In this section, we study the optimum detection threshold that minimizes the total detection
error probability and the resulting minimum total detection error probability. If we let X = |ĝ+ g̃|2,
then X is a non-central Chi-square random variable with non-centrality parameter |ĝ|2 and variance













where I0(·) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind with zeroth order2. Therefore, it follows










As a special case, if there is no uncertainty about the noise power, i.e. fσ2w(y) = δ(y − σ̂
2
w) where

















which matches with the result in [3] for the case of infinite number of samples.
2In [57], X is replaced by |ĝ|2 + |g̃|2.
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If λ < σ̂2w/ρ, the second integral of (3.15) is 0 and thus ξ(ĝ) = 1. If λ ≥ ρσ̂2w, ξ(ĝ) is an
increasing function of λ. Therefore, the optimum detection threshold that minimizes ξ(ĝ) should




























































where γ = P/σ̂2w. The derivation of (3.19) is provided in Appendix B.1. Also, it is shown in
Appendix B.2 that ξ(ĝ) is a strictly pseudo-convex function of λ for λ ≥ σ̂2w/ρ. Therefore, there
should exist unique minima. The optimum λ that minimizes ξ(ĝ) can be found by taking the

















dx = 0. (3.20)



































where the integration can be computed by using Trapezoidal method. Then, averaging (3.22)
over ĝ (averaging over multiple coherence time intervals) yields the minimum total detection error
probability, ξmin. In the remaining part of this section, we derive the minimum total detection
error probability for several special cases.
Fig. 3.2 illustrates the total detection error probability versus the detection threshold for
different values of ĝ. If |ĝ|2 is small (say 0.1), λ⊥ is smaller than ρσ̂2w. Hence, the optimum
detection threshold that minimizes ξ(ĝ) is λ⊥. But if |ĝ|2 is large (say 0.5), λ⊥ becomes larger
24
than ρσ̂2w. Hence, the optimum detection threshold is ρσ̂
2
w. Below we consider three special cases
of ĝ = g (β = 0), perfect CSI; ĝ = 0 (β = 1), no CSI; and no fading.












Figure 3.2 Total detection error probability ξ(ĝ) versus detection threshold λ for different
values of |ĝ|2; σ2gP/σ̂2w = 3dB, β = 0.1, and ρ = 2dB.
3.3.1 Perfect CSI at Willie
If the channel gain g is known perfectly to Willie, i.e. ĝ = g or β = 0, then the conditional PDF
of X given ĝ is given by
fX(x|ĝ) = δ(x− |ĝ|2). (3.23)



































λ ≤ |ĝ|2P + σ̂2w/ρ,
λ > |ĝ|2P + σ̂2w/ρ.
(3.25)
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Since dξ(ĝ)/dλ is negative for λ ≤ |ĝ|2P+σ̂2w/ρ and positive for λ > |ĝ|2P+σ̂2w/ρ, ξ(ĝ) is minimized















As a special case, if ρ = 1 then we obtain λ∗ = σ̂2w, which matches with the result in [6].
Applying (3.26) to (3.24) yields the minimum instantaneous total detection error probability
ξmin(ĝ)=
(





where (x)+ = max(x, 0). Note that ξmin(ĝ) reduces to 0 if the received SNR, |ĝ|2γ, is above a




































−1etdt is the exponential integral function.
Graphical Interpretation: Fig. 3.3 illustrates PM and PF under channel uncertainty and noise
uncertainty in general. Since the PDF fσ2w(x) is a decreasing function, the sum PM+PF is minimized
when λ − |ĝ + g̃|2P is equal to σ̂2w/ρ, which makes PM = 0. Therefore, if g̃ = 0, i.e. perfect CSI,
PM + PF is minimized by choosing λ = |ĝ|2P + σ̂2w/ρ, where ξmin = 1 − 12 ln(ρ) ln(1 + ρ|ĝ|
2γ). If
|ĝ|2P + σ̂2w/ρ > ρσ̂2w, i.e. |ĝ|2γ > ρ−ρ−1, then PF = 0 because λ > ρσ̂2w and consequently ξmin = 0.
Low SNR Approximation: Since Ei(−x) ' −12e

































Figure 3.3 Probability of missed detection and false alarm.
for σ2gγ  1.
High SNR Approximation: For x  1, ex ' 1 + x and Ei(−x) ' c + ln(x) − x, where c is the



































which decays inverse linearly with the received SNR, σ2gγ.
3.3.2 No CSI at Willie




g/σ2g , x ≥ 0. (3.36)
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Then, it can be shown from (3.19) and (3.36) that the total detection error probability is given by























































for λ ≥ σ̂2w/ρ. The derivation of (3.38) is provided in Appendix B.3.












= 0, λ ≥ σ̂2w/ρ. (3.40)





w], it is given by
λ∗ = min{λ†, ρσ̂2w}. (3.41)



























It should be noted from (3.40) that λ† is proportional to σ2gP as the LHS of (3.40) is a function
of λ/(σ2gP ). Hence, the condition λ











w represents the received SNR at Willie. Also, the optimum detection threshold in
(3.41) assumes the knowledge of the average received power, σ2gP , by Willie as λ
† is proportional
to σ2gP .
Fig.3.4 shows the detection error probability, ξ, versus the received SNR, σ2gP/σ̂
2
w, with two
detection thresholds, λ† and ρσ̂2w. It can be seen that λ
† provides a lower ξ than ρσ̂2w if the received
SNR is less than a threshold, and, otherwise, ρσ̂2w provides a lower ξ than λ
†.
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Figure 3.4 Average total detection error probability, ξ, versus the average receive SNR,
σ2gP/σ̂
2
w, under no CSI; ρ = 2dB.
3.3.3 AWGN Channel









which matches with the result in [31].
3.3.4 Numerical Results
Fig. 3.5 illustrates the minimum total detection error probability, ξmin, versus the average
received SNR at Willie, σ2gP/σ̂
2
w, for different channel uncertainty, β. Also shown in the figure
is ξmin for AWGN channel. It can be seen that when the received SNR is low, ξmin is close to
1, regardless of the channel fading. However, when the received SNR is high, ξmin drops quickly
to zero in AWGN channel if the received SNR is above a threshold (as shown in (3.43)), while in
Rayleigh fading channel it decreases gradually (inverse linearly) with the received SNR (as shown
29
in (3.35)). Therefore, channel fading plays a critical role in hiding the signal transmission when
the received SNR is high.















Figure 3.5 The minimum total detection error probability, ξmin, versus average receive
SNR, σ2gP/σ̂
2
w, for different values of β; ρ = 2dB.
Fig. 3.6 illustrates the minimum total detection error probability, ξmin, versus the noise un-
certainty for different channel uncertainty, β. It can be seen that the channel fading is critical to
hiding the signal transmission if the noise uncertainty, ρ, is below a threshold where ξmin is 0 in
AWGN channel. Imperfect knowledge of the channel gain increases the minimum total detection
error probability, particularly when the noise uncertainty is large. However, if the noise uncertainty
is small, imperfect knowledge of the channel gain has little impact on the minimum total detection
error probability.
3.4 Covert Throughput
In this section we study the covert throughput, defined as the maximum average rate (bits/s/Hz)
between Alice and Bob subject to the covert constraint of ξmin ≥ 1− ε as N →∞. Assuming that
Alice is not aware of the channel gain, h, to Bob (due to unavailability of pilot transmission from
30
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Figure 3.6 The minimum total detection error probability, ξmin, versus noise uncertainty,
ρ, for different values of β; σ2gP/σ̂
2
w = −5dB.
Bob to avoid being detected by Willie), we consider sending the message at a fixed rate, R, in slowly-
varying channels, where the instantaneous SNR is constant over a large number of transmissions
(a transmission burst) and then changes to a new value based on the fading distribution.
With this model, the correct metric for Alice’s performance is capacity with outage [26]. The
message is correctly received if the instantaneous received SNR is greater than or equal to 2R − 1.
If the instantaneous received SNR is below 2R − 1 then the bits received over that transmission
burst cannot be decoded correctly, and the receiver declares an outage. The probability of decoding
outage at Bob is thus
PO = Pr(log2(1 + |h|2P/σ2b ) < R) (3.44)
= 1− exp
(
−(2R − 1)/(σ2hP/σ2b )
)
(3.45)
in Rayleigh fading channel, where σ2h = E[|h|2] and σ2b is the noise power of Bob. The average rate
correctly received over many transmission bursts is R(1 − PO) since the message is only correctly
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s.t. ξmin ≥ 1− ε. (3.47)





b )/ ln 2, where W0(x), solution of x = W0(x)e
W0(x), is the Lambert-W function with
branch 0 [18].
Since ξmin(ĝ) in (3.22) decreases monotonically with increasing γ = P/σ̂
2
w, the covert constraint
ξmin ≥ 1−ε requires P ≤ P ∗ for some threshold P ∗ which is computed from ξmin = 1−ε. Therefore,
























∗/σ2b  1. In the remaining part of this section, we derive the covert throughput for several
special cases.
3.4.1 Perfect CSI at Willie
If Willie knows his channel gain g perfectly, then it follows from (3.32) that P ∗ can be approx-
imated by


















3The maximization in (3.46) is achieved without constraint on PO. If PO needs to be below a threshold, δ, then
the covert throughput is log2(1 + σ
2
hγ ln(1− δ)−1) subject to the covert constraint of ξmin ≥ 1− ε.
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3.4.2 No CSI at Willie
If Willie has no knowledge on his channel gain g, then ξmin < 0.9 if λ
† ≥ ρσ̂2w for 1.0002 ≤ ρ ≤
3.16 and hence for ξmin ≥ 0.9 and 1.0002 ≤ ρ ≤ 3.16, which is the range of practical interest, we
need to consider the case of λ† < ρσ̂2w only in (3.42). The derivation of range of interest is provided





≥ 1− ε, (3.52)
for λ† < ρσ̂2w, which yields
σ2gP/(2ε ln(ρ)) ≤ λ† < ρσ̂2w. (3.53)
Therefore, the maximum transmission power for ξmin ≥ 1− ε while satisfying (3.53) is given by
P ∗ = min{Pn, 2ερ ln(ρ)}σ̂2w/σ2g , (3.54)
where Pn is the solution of λ
† = σ2gP/(2ε ln(ρ)). The covert throughput under no CSI, denoted ηn,
can then be obtained from (3.48) and (3.54).
Low SNR approximation: At low SNR, σ2gγ  1, it can be shown that the maximum transmis-
sion power for ξmin ≥ 1− ε is approximately given by












where W−1(x) is the Lambert-W function with branch -1 [18]. The derivation of (3.55) is provided
in Appendix B.5.



















+ ln (2ε ln(ρ)) , (3.57)
for ε 1. Therefore, it follows from (3.49), (3.55) and (3.57) that the covert throughput under no















Remark: It can be seen from (3.50) and (3.58) that the channel uncertainty increases the covert







2ε ln(ρ) + ln (2ε ln(ρ))
) . (3.59)
3.4.3 AWGN Channel
It follows from (3.43) that the maximum transmission power for ξmin ≥ 1− ε is given by
P ∗ = (ρ2ε−1 − ρ−1)σ̂2w/σ2g . (3.60)
Therefore, the covert throughput in AWGN channel is given by


























by applying ln(1 + x) ' x for x 1.
Remark: It can be seen from (3.50) and (3.60) that channel fading allows the maximum trans-
mission power to be increased by a factor of (ρ2ε+1)/2 over the AWGN channel while still satisfying








which converges to e−1 as ρ → 1 (no noise uncertainty) or ε → 0 (perfect privacy). It can also be
seen from (3.64) that the covert throughput loss caused by channel fading is more significant if the
noise uncertainty ρ and/or the covert constraint ε is smaller.
3.4.4 Numerical Results
Fig. 3.7 illustrates the covert throughput versus the noise uncertainty, ρ, for different values of ε
that represents the covertness of communication. It can be seen that the covert throughput increases
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monotonically with ρ and that the approximate covert throughput in (3.51), (3.58), and (3.63)
are fairly close to the exact one. The channel uncertainty helps increase the covert throughput,
particularly when the noise uncertainty is large, but the improvement is limited when the covert
constraint is strict, e.g. ε = 0.01. Even though the channel fading increases ξmin, as seen in Figs.
3.5 and 3.6, it decreases the covert throughput. This is mainly due to a high decoding outage
probability at low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in Rayleigh fading channel.
Fig. 3.8 illustrates the covert throughput, η, versus the covert constraint, ε. It can be seen that
η increases as the covert constraint is relaxed, i.e. ε is increased. If ε is close to 1, the channel fading
can help increase the covert throughput. This is because ξmin decreases gradually (inverse linearly)
with the received SNR in Rayleigh fading channel while it drops sharply to zero in AWGN channel
(see Fig. 3.5). Therefore, if ξmin is allowed to be small, i.e. ε is close to 1, the maximum allowed
transmit power can be much higher in fading channel than in AWGN channel, which results in a








































Fig. 3.9 illustrates the covert throughput gain, ηn/ηp, provided by the channel uncertainty
at the adversary versus the covert constraint, ε, for different values of ρ. One can see that the
covert throughput gain is more significant when the noise uncertainty ρ is larger and ε is larger.
For ε = 0.1, the covert throughput gain provided by the channel uncertainty is 12% ∼ 19% for
ρ = 1 ∼ 2 dB.
3.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we analyzed the joint impact of imperfect knowledge of the channel gain and
noise power at the adversary on the total detection error probability and the covert throughput
in Rayleigh fading channel. We found that the channel fading is crucial to hiding the signal
transmission, particularly when the noise uncertainty is low or the receive SNR is high. We also
found that the impact of the channel uncertainty on the total detection error probability and
the covert throughput is particularly noticeable when the noise uncertainty is large. Imperfect
knowledge of the channel gain at the adversary provides a covert throughput gain of 12% ∼ 19%
over the perfect channel knowledge when the noise uncertainty is in the range of 1 ∼ 2 dB.
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Figure 3.9 ηn/ηp versus ε for different values of ρ.
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CHAPTER 4. COVERT NON-ORTHOGONAL MULTIPLE ACCESS
In this chapter, we study the privacy (covertness) in NOMA system. The covert message is
superimposed onto K non-covert (public) messages in NOMA system such that the total trans-
mission power remains the same whether or not the covert message is transmitted. We show that
the covert message can be detected only when the non-covert message, where the covert message is
superimposed onto, can be decoded. This suggests hiding the covert message under the non-covert
message that is most difficult to decode. Hence, the effectiveness of hiding the covert message
can be improved by exploiting the multiplicity of users in NOMA system. We determine the total
detection error probability (sum of false alarm and missed detection probability) as a function of
the number of users in Rayleigh fading channel. We show that it increases and converges to 1 as
the number of non-covert users increases. This means that the covert transmission is undetectable
if the number of non-covert users is sufficiently large. We also show that the total detection error
probability can be increased as the transmit power is increased, thereby increasing the covert rate,
by adapting the superposition rule to the channel variations.
The remaining part of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes the system
model. Section 4.2 describes the optimum detection strategy at the adversary. Section 4.3 derives
the optimum detection threshold that minimizes the total detection error probability. Section 4.4
derives the optimum cover set for the transmitter to maximize the total detection error probability
and Section 4.5 derives the resulting maximum total detection error probability. Section 4.6 derives
the decoding outage probability. Sections 4.7 and 4.8 describe the covert rate and the no-covert
rate, respectively. Sections 4.9 and 4.10 describes the channel adaptation and multiple antenna
at the transmitter, respectively. Section 4.11 shows the numerical results and 4.12 concludes the
chapter.
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Figure 4.1 Alice attempts to hide the transmission of covert message u against Willie by
using non-covert messages v1, ...,vL as a cover (camouflage).
4.1 System Model
We consider a downlink NOMA system in which the transmitter (Alice) sends a covert message
u = (u1, ..., un) to a covert user (Bob) and non-covert messages v1, ...,vL, where vj = (v1,j , ..., vn,j),
to L non-covert users. The system model is illustrated in Fig.4.1. A warden (Willie) is interested
in finding whether any message other than v1, ...,vL is sent from Alice. Willie’s objectives is not
to decode u, but merely to detect the transmission of u.
The transmitter hides the transmission of u by superimposing it onto K non-covert messages,
where K ≤ L. Let E denote the set of indices of those K non-covert messages and Ec denote the
complement of E . For example, if u is superimposed onto v1, v5, and v9, then E = {1, 5, 9}. The
optimum choice of E will be discussed in Section 4.4. Then, the transmitted signal from Willie’s















where α ∈ (0, 1) is the power allocation between the covert message and K non-covert messages
where u is superimposed. H0 denotes the hypothesis that Alice did not send the covert message u
and H1 denotes the alternative hypothesis that Alice did send u. We assume that vl, l = 1, ..., L,
and u are independent complex Gaussian random vectors with mean zero and variance Pl and∑
l∈E Pl, respectively, where
∑L
l=1 Pl = P . Note that the transmission power of x is equal to P
regardless of the transmission of u.
We assume that all nodes are equipped with single antenna. Let fj , h and g denote the channel
gain between Alice and the j-th non-covert user, that between Alice and Bob, and that between
Alice and Willie, respectively. We assume they are independent complex Gaussian random variables




g , respectively. Then, the received signal at the j-th













l∈Ec vl) + nj , H1,
(4.2)
where nj = {n1,j , ..., nn,j} is the complex Gaussian noise vector with mean 0 and variance σ2n.
We assume that Alice knows fl, l = 1, ..., L, perfectly via the forward channel training (pilot
signal is sent by Alice and then the channel gains are estimated by the non-covert users and fedback
to Alice) or the reverse channel training (pilot signals are sent by the non-covert users and Alice
estimates the channel gains using the channel reciprocity). However, we assume Alice does not
know h, because Bob does not want to reveal his presence and hence does not send his channel
gain h to Alice.
4.1.1 Achievable Rate
Without loss of generality, we assume |f1|2 ≥ |f2|2 ≥ ... ≥ |fL|2. Each user applies the successive
interference cancellation (SIC) to decode its own message: the j-th user will first decode vl, l > j,
and then eliminate it from yj in a successive manner. vl, l < j, will be treated as noise. The











where γl = Pl/σ
2
n. The achievable rate of the j-th user under H1 depends on whether u is super-
imposed onto vj (j ∈ E) or not (j ∈ Ec). If j ∈ E , the j-th user, after cancelling vl, l > j, from yj
obtains
y′j =fj








+ nj . (4.4)
Then, the achievable rate of the j-th user under H1 is given by
Rj,1 = log2
1 + |fj |2αγj
















for j ∈ E .
4.1.2 Transmission Rate
We assume Alice sends vj , j ∈ E , at the rate of Rj,1 in order to guarantee that the j-th user
can decode vj regardless of the transmission of u.
4.2 Willie’s Detection Strategy













l∈Ec vl) + nw, H1,
(4.6)
where nw = {n1,w, ..., nn,w} is the complex Gaussian vector with mean 0 and variance σ2n, Based
on his observation vector yw of length n, Willie has to decide between the hypotheses, H0 and H1,
regarding the transmission of u.
We assume Willie knows the complete statistics of his observations under both hypotheses. This
means he knows all parameters, such as noise variance, signal power and channel coefficient g. He
uses a radio meter (energy detector), which is optimal when the message and the noise are modeled
as white Gaussian processes1 [61, 8], to detect the covert message by comparing the radio meter
1For other models, such as zero-mean finite signal constellation and orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing
(OFDM) signal, energy detection perform close to the optimal detector [56, 7].
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where λ is a detection threshold. If Willie is allowed to observe an infinite number of samples,
which minimizes the total detection error probability, the test statistic T converges to






by the law of large numbers under both H0 and H1. The event of false alarm occurs if T > λ
when Alice did not send u and missed detection occurs if T ≤ λ when Alice did send u. Since the
test statistic T are identical under H0 and H1, the transmission of the covert message cannot be
detected from yw.
However, if Willie succeeds in decoding some vl’s and subtracts them from yw to get




















l∈Ec∩Dc vl) + nW , H1,
(4.10)
where D denotes the index set of the non-covert messages that are decoded by Willie after the SIC




























Remark 1: T ′ under H1 is different from that under H0 if E ∩D 6= ∅. Hence, the transmission
of the covert message can be detected perfectly from T ′ (when n → ∞) if E ∩ D 6= ∅, i.e. any vl,
l ∈ E , is decoded by Willie.
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4.3 Optimum Detection Threshold for Willie
The total detection error probability, averaged over the events of E ∩ D = ∅ and E ∩ D 6= ∅, is
given by
PF + PM =Pr(T > λ, E ∩ D = ∅|H0) + Pr(T ′ > λ′, E ∩ D 6= ∅|H0)
+ Pr(T ≤ λ, E ∩ D = ∅|H1) + Pr(T ′ ≤ λ′, E ∩ D 6= ∅|H1). (4.13)
Willie’s goal is to minimize PF + PM by choosing the detection thresholds λ and λ
′ properly.
i) λ′: Willie can choose λ′ ∈ [|g|2
∑








l∈E∩D Pl) + σ
2
n) to
make the second and fourth term in (4.13) zero.
ii) λ: Willie can choose λ < T , namely λ < |g|2
∑L
l=1 Pl + σ
2
n, if Pr(E ∩ D = ∅|H0) < Pr(E ∩ D =
∅|H1) and, otherwise, choose λ ≥ T to minimize PF + PM .
The resulting minimum total detection error probability is given by
ξmin :=min
λ,λ′
PF + PM (4.14)











I(vj ; yw,j) < Rj,1
∣∣∣∣H1
}, (4.16)
where yw,j = yw − g
∑
l∈Dj vl, Dj is the decoding set prior to decoding vj , and






























is the mutual information between vj and yw,j . (4.17) can be obtained from (4.10) with D replaced
by Dj . It can be shown from (4.17) that I(vj ; yw,j) under H1 is smaller than that under H0.
Therefore, Willie will choose λ < T , i.e. λ < |g|2
∑L
l=1 Pl + σ
2








4.4 Optimum Cover Set E for Alice
Alice’s goal is to maximize ξmin by choosing the cover set E properly. It can be shown from
(4.18) that the optimum |E| that maximizes ξmin is 1. This means the covert message u should be
superimposed onto one non-covert message. The resulting maximum total detection error proba-

































where (x)+ = max{0, x}.
When g and Dcj are unknown to Alice, the maximum of (4.22) is achieved by maximizing |fj |2
and minimizing
∑j
l=1 γl. Since |f1|
2 = max1≤l≤L |fl|2 and
∑j
l=1 γl decreases with decreasing j, the
maximum of (4.22) is achieved when j = 1, i.e. superimposing u onto v1, which yields











Remark 2: The best hiding strategy that maximizes the total detection error probability is
to superimpose the covert message u onto the non-covert message v1 that experiences the highest
channel gain among all non-covert users.
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4.5 Maximum Total Detection Error Probability
In this section, we determine the maximum total detection error probability, ξmax. By the law












, |fk+1|2 ≤ |g|2 < |fk|2
)
, (4.25)
where |f0|2 =∞ and |fL+1|2 = 0.
i) k = 0, i.e. |f1|2 ≤ |g|2 < ∞: Willie can decode v2, ...,vL if |f1|2 ≤ |g|2. Hence, Dc1 = {1}.






, |f1|2 ≤ |g|2
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−t)m−1(e−t)ndt is the Beta function [4].






l=1 γl − γ1)
)+ . (4.30)





l=1 γl − γ1)+
, (4.31)
we obtain










































Figure 4.2 The maximum total detection error probability, ξmax, versus L for different
values of P/σ2n; α = 0.9, Pl = P/L for 1 ≤ l ≤ L and σ2f = σ2g = 1.
Therefore, it follows from (4.25), (4.29) and (4.33) that the maximum total detection error proba-





































Remark 3: When Dc1 = {1}, which is assumed in the analysis of secrecy in NOMA [29, 74], it




















It can be seen in Fig. 4.2 that ξmax in (4.36) is less than that in (4.34) and their difference is more
significant for larger SNR or L. This indicates that the assumption of Dc1 = {1}, which simplifies
the analysis, overestimates Willie’s ability of decoding and then causes the incorrect result.
Remark 4: ξmax in (4.34) converges to
ξmax → 1 (4.37)
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as L→∞ regardless of the SNR. This means the transmission of u is undetectable if L is sufficiently
large. The proof is provided in Appendix C.1.
4.6 Decoding Outage Probability
In this section, we determine the decoding outage probability of the covert message at Bob












where nb ∼ CN(0, σ2n). Since the transmitter does not know the channel gain of the covert user,
the covert message is sent at a fixed rate Ru. Then, the decoding outage probability of the covert
message is given by
Po,u=Pr(I(u; yb) < Ru). (4.39)




Pr(I(u; yb) ≥ Ru, |fk+1|2 ≤ |h|2 < |fk|2). (4.40)










+ nb, 1 ≤ k ≤ L,
h
√
1− αu + nb, k = 0
(4.41)














for 2 ≤ j ≤ L, and

















, j ≥ 1.
(4.42)











, 1 ≤ k ≤ L,
log2
(
1 + |h|2(1− α)γ1
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+ , 1 ≤ k ≤ L,
(2Ru − 1)/((1− α)γ1), k = 0.
(4.46)


















B(e−µkσ2f ; k + σ2f
σ2h






n−1(1 − z)m−1dz =
∫∞
x (1 − e
−t)m−1(e−t)ndt is the incomplete Beta
function and B(0;n,m) = 0 and B(1;n,m) = B(n,m) [4].
4.7 Covert Rate
In this section, we analyze the covert rate, defined as the maximum reliable transmission rate
(bits/s/Hz) between Alice and Bob subject to the covert constraint of ξmax ≥ 1−ε for some ε which
represents the covertness requirement. The average rate received over many transmission bursts is
Ru(1 − Po,u) since the covert message is correctly received on 1 − Po,u transmissions. Therefore,
the covert rate (bits/Hz/s) is given by
η(Ru) = Ru(1− Po,u) (4.49)
s.t. ξmax ≥ 1− ε (4.50)






In this section, we determine the rate of the non-covert message v1 where the covert message
















is the probability density function (PDF) of |f1|2 [20].
4.9 Channel Adaptation
In this section, we exploit the channel variation to minimize the throughput loss for vj , j ∈ E ,
caused by the superposition (transmission) of u. We consider sending u only when the channel gain
fj of vj is below a threshold, τ , i.e. |fj |2 < τ , where the transmission rate of vj is low. Therefore,










l 6=j vl, |fj |2 < τ.
(4.54)
We assume the reverse channel training is employed to guarantee that Willie cannot estimate fl’s,
and hence cannot detect the transmission of u based on fl’s.
We consider sending vj , j ∈ E , at the rate Rj,0 which guarantees the successful decoding vj
by the intended receiver when u is not transmitted, i.e. |fj |2 ≥ τ . When u is transmitted, i.e.
|fj |2 < τ , then the intended receiver of vj will fail to decode it due to the interference of u. However,
throughput loss of vj can be small because its transmission rate is small when |fj |2 < τ . Therefore,
we obtain from (4.16) with |E| = 1 and Rj,1 replaced by Rj,0 that
ξmin=min{Pr
(








4.9.1 Maximum Total Detection Error Probability
Similar to the case of no channel adaptation in Section 4.4, it can be shown that ξmin is
maximized when j = 1, i.e. u is superimposed onto v1. The proof is provided in Appendix C.2.
Then, the maximum detection error probability is given by
ξmax=min{ξ0, ξ1}, (4.56)
where











































n−1(1 − z)m−1dz =
∫∞
x (1 − e
−t)m−1(e−t)ndt is the incomplete Beta
function [4], and














































for τ ≤ α(1−α)γ1 , where a1 =
τ
α−(1−α)γ1τ . The proof of (4.58)-(4.63) is provided in Appendix C.3.
Remark 5: ξmax converges to
ξmax → 1 (4.64)
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as L → ∞ if τ > α(1−α)γ1 . This means the transmission of the covert message is completely unde-
tectable if the number of non-covert users is sufficiently large. The proof is provided in Appendix
C.4.
4.9.2 Decoding Error Probability
In this subsection, we determine the decoding outage probability of the covert message u and
the non-covert message v1 where u is superimposed.
4.9.2.1 Covert message
Since we transmit u when |f1|2 < τ , the decoding outage probability of u for Bob is given by
Po,u = Pr(I(u; yb) < Ru| |f1|2 < τ) (4.65)
By the law of total probability, Po,u can be expressed as
Po,u=1− Pr
(













Pr(I(u; y′b)k ≥ Ru, |fk+1|2 ≤ |h|2 < |fk|2||f1|2 < τ), (4.66)








for 1 ≤ j ≤ L, we obtain that Bob can decode and remove vk+1, ...,vL if |h|2 ≥ |f1|
2
(α−|f1|2(1−α)γ1)+
for k = 0, if |f2|2 ≤ |h|2 < |f1|
2
(α−|f1|2(1−α)γ1)+ for k = 1, and if |fk+1|




























































































The proof of (4.67) is provided in Appendix C.5.
4.9.2.2 Non-covert message
Since the transmission rate of R1,0 guarantees the successful decoding of v1 only when u is not
sent, i.e. |f1|2 ≥ τ , the intended receiver of v1 will fail to decode it with probability




For given Po,v, the required τ is






which is an increasing function of L.
4.9.3 Covert Rate
The covert rate is given by
η(Ru) = Ru(1− Po,u)Po,v (4.71)
s.t. ξmax ≥ 1− ε, (4.72)
where the factor Po,v is to account for the fact that the covert message is sent only when |f1|2 > τ .
52
4.9.4 Non-covert Rate
The intended receiver of v1 will fail to decode it if |f1|2 ≥ τ due to the interference from the




log2(1 + xγ1)f|f1|2(x)dx. (4.73)
4.10 Multiple Antenna at Transmitter
In this section, we consider that the transmitter has M antennas and select one out of M
antennas to transmit message information. In this case, only one RF chain is needed such that
the hardware cost, the power consumption of circuit and the computational complexity is reduced
while the diversity of transmitter’s multiple antennas is preserved [21, 69]. We assume the m-th
antenna is selected at the transmitter. For convenience, we change the denotation of channel gains:
g → gm, h→ hm and fj → fm,j for 1 ≤ j ≤ L and 1 ≤ m ≤M .
When the m-th antenna is selected, it follows from Remark 2 that superimposing u onto the
non-covert message which experiences the highest-channel gain among all non-covert users is also
optimal to maximize the total detection error probability. Hence, we further change the denotation
of the total detection error probability in (4.24) to ξmax(m).
4.10.1 Optimum Antenna Selection for Alice
















Assuming |f1,1|2 = max1≤m≤M,1≤l≤L |fm,l|2, since ξmax(m) increases with increasing |fm,1|2, then











For the case of channel adaptation, we also obtain that ξmax(m) is maximized when m = 1.
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Remark 6: The optimum antenna selection strategy that maximizes the total detection error
probability is to select the antenna that provides the highest channel gain among all users and
all transmitter’s antennas2. Note that the antenna chosen to maximize the total detection error
probability is to maximize the rate of v1 where u is superimposed. Hence, the order statistic
of |f1,1|2 is known while the order statistic of |f1,2|2, ..., |f1,L|2 is unknown. Therefore, we will
recompute the maximum total detection error probability and decoding outage probability in the
next subsections.
4.10.2 Maximum total detection error probability
For the case with channel adaptation, it follows from (4.25) with |g|2 replaced by |gm|2 and


























































The proof of (4.78) is provided in Appendix C.6.
For the case with channel adaptation, the maximum total detection error probability can be
obtained from (4.56), (4.59), (4.62) and (4.63) with L replaced by LM .
2Note that choosing the antenna providing the highest channel gain among all users and transmitter’s antennas is
considered in [69] to achieve a nearly-optimal sum rate in NOMA system. When high SNR, i.e. γl →∞, l = 1, ..., L,
it follows from (4.3) with |fj |2 replaced by |fm,j |2 that the sum rate can be approximated by
L∑
j=1











which is maximized when |fm,1|2 is maximized. Therefore, choosing the antenna providing the highest channel gain
among all users and transmitter’s antennas is optimal to maximize the sum rate at high SNR.
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4.10.3 Decoding Outage Probability



























B(e−µkσ2f ; k + l + σ2f
σ2h
, LM − k − l + 1
)
. (4.79)





































































































The decoding outage probability of v1 can be obtained from (4.69) with L replaced by LM .
4.11 Numerical Results
In this section, we present the numerical results. we name the transmission scheme in (4.54) as
‘channel adaptation’ and that without channel adaptation as ‘no channel adaptation’.
4.11.1 Maximum total detection error probability
Fig. 4.3 compares the maximum total detection error probability, ξmax, with channel adaptation
and no channel adaptation versus L for different values of M . For the channel adaptation case, the
parameter τ is set such that Po,v = 0.01. One can see that ξmax increases and converges to 1 as L
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Figure 4.3 The maximum total detection error probability, ξmax, versus L for different
values of M ; P/σ2n = 20dB, α = 0.9, Pl = P/L for 1 ≤ l ≤ L, σ2f = σ2g = 1 and
Po,v = 0.01.
increases and that the convergence speed is faster for larger M . The simulation results match well
with the analytical results.
Fig. 4.4 compares the maximum total detection error probability, ξmax, with channel adaptation
and no channel adaptation versus the transmit SNR, P/σ2n, for different values of Po,v. One can
see that ξmax with channel adaptation increases with increasing SNR while that with no channel
adaptation decreases with increasing SNR. The reason for the increase of ξmax with increasing SNR
is the difference between the transmission rate R1,0 of v1 in (4.3) and the achievable rate I(v1; yw,1)
of Willie in (4.17) increases with increasing SNR. This suggests switching the transmission mode
(channel adaptation and no channel adaptation) depending on the transmit power to maximize
ξmax. One can also see that ξmax with channel adaptation increases as Po,v increases. The decrease
of ξmax to maintain a low Po,v is small at high SNR.
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Figure 4.4 The maximum total detection error probability, ξmax, versus the transmit SNR,
P/σ2n, for different values of Po,v; α = 0.9, M = 8, L = 5, Pl = P/L for
1 ≤ l ≤ L, and σ2f = σ2g = 1.
4.11.2 Covert rate
Figure 4.5 compares the decoding outage probability, Po,u, with channel adaptation (τ = α/((1−
α)γ1)) and no channel adaptation (τ = ∞). One can see that the decoding outage probability is
higher for larger L, which is because the covert user experiences more interference of the non-
covert messages with increasing L. Although an increase of the interference can help increasing the
total detection error probability, it will increase the decoding outage probability at the covert user.
One can also see that the channel adaptation yields a higher decoding outage probability than no
channel adaptation. The simulation result matches well with the analytical result.
Figure 4.6 compares the covert rate (bits/s/Hz), ηu, with channel adaptation and no channel
adaptation versus the maximum total detection error probability, ξmax, as the SNR is varied. The
decoding outage probability, Po,v, of the non-covert message is fixed at 0.3 and 0.4 for the channel
adaptation case. One can see that the covert rate can be traded with ξmax for the case of no channel
adaptation. The channel adaptation can provide higher covert rate than no channel adaptation
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Figure 4.5 Decoding outage probability, Po,u, versus Ru for different values of L; M = 2,
P/σ2n = 5dB, α = 0.9, Pl = P/L for 1 ≤ l ≤ L, and σ2f = σ2h = 1.
for high ξmax (close to 1), which is the range of practical interest. However, for low ξmax, the
latter provides higher covert rate than the former. This suggests switching the transmission mode
(no channel adaptation vs channel adaptation) depending on the covertness requirement, namely
ξmax. One can also see that the covert rate for the case of channel adaptation also increases with
increasing ξmax, which because the transmission power increases.
Figure 4.7 compares the non-covert rate (bits/s/Hz) with channel adaptation and no channel
adaptation versus the maximum total detection error probability, ξmax, as the SNR is varied. One
can see that the channel adaptation can provide higher non-covert rate than no channel adaptation
for high ξmax (close to 1). One can also see from Figs. 4.6 and 4.7 that there is the tradeoff between
the covert and non-covert throughput for high ξmax (close to 1).
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Figure 4.6 covert rate (bits/s/Hz), ηu, versus maximum total detection error probability
ξmax; M = 8, α = 0.8, L = 10, Pl = P/L for 1 ≤ l ≤ L, and σ2f = σ2h = σ2g = 1.




































Figure 4.7 Non-covert rate (bits/s/Hz) versus maximum total detection error probability,
ξmax; M = 8, α = 0.8, L = 10, Pl = P/L for 1 ≤ l ≤ L, and σ2f = σ2h = σ2g = 1.
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4.12 Chapter Summary
We considered hiding a covert message under other messages in NOMA system. We determined
the adversary’s optimum detection strategy that minimizes the total detection error probability and
the communicator’s optimum superposition strategy that maximizes the minimum total detection
error probability. We found that the total detection error probability increases and converges to
1 as the number of users (messages) increases. We also found that that the total detection error
probability and the covert rate can be increased as the transmission power increases by adapting
the superposition rule to the channel variation.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusions and Contributions
This thesis focuses on contributing to the improvement of the physical-layer secrecy and privacy
of wireless communication. A brief summary of the main contributions is presented.
In Chapter 2, we investigated joint rate and power adaptation to maximize the energy efficiency
of physical-layer secrecy. We formulated an optimization problem of maximizing the secrecy energy
efficiency (SEE) subject to an average transmission power constraint. We determined the optimum
rate and power adaptation rule that maximizes the SEE, and also determined sub-optimal rate
and power adaptation rules: on-off variable rate, fixed power variable rate and variable power fixed
rate. We characterized the SEE gain by varying rate and/or the power, and the impact of number
of antennas on the optimum adaptation rule.
In Chapter 3, we analyzed the joint impact of imperfect knowledge of noise power and channel
gain at the adversary on the total detection error probability and the covert throughput. We deter-
mined the optimum detection threshold for the energy detector that minimizes the total detection
error probability as a function of the channel gain estimate. Then, we determined the maximum
allowed transmission power for the total detection error probability to be no less than a threshold.
Based on this, we determined the maximum average transmission rate (bits/s/Hz) subject to a
covert communication constraint, hereafter referred to as the covert throughput. We characterized
the covert throughput gain provided by imperfect knowledge of the channel gain and noise power
at the adversary and the covert throughput loss caused by the channel fading as a function of the
noise uncertainty. Our analysis showed that the channel fading is crucial to hiding the signal trans-
mission, particularly when the noise uncertainty is low and/or the receive SNR is high. The impact
of the channel uncertainty on the total detection error probability and the covert throughput is
particularly noticeable when the noise uncertainty is large. The channel uncertainty provides a
61
covert throughput gain of 12% ∼ 19% over the case that perfect channel knowledge is available
at the adversary when the noise uncertainty is in the range of 1 ∼ 2 dB. However, if the noise
uncertainty is small, the channel uncertainty does not help much increase the total detection error
probability and the covert throughput.
In Chap 4, we studied covertness in NOMA system; that is, hiding the covert message under
superposition of other messages in NOMA system. We determined the adversary’s optimum de-
tection strategy and the transmitter’s optimum hiding message strategy. Then, We analyzed the
resulting maximum total detection error probability and decoding outage probability with covert
rate. We exploited the channel variation to further increase the total detection error probability.
We found that the covert message can be detected only when the non-covert message, where the
covert message is superimposed onto, can be decoded. This suggests hiding the covert message un-
der the non-covert message that is most difficult to decode. We also found that the covert message
is harder to be decoded if the non-covert rate is transmitted at higher rate. This suggests selecting
the best antenna which can provide the highest channel gain among all user and transmitter’s an-
tenna. Our results showed that the total detection error probability increases and converges to 1 as
the number of users increases, and convergence speed is faster with larger number of transmitter’s
antenna. This means that the covert transmission is undetectable if the number of non-covert users
is sufficiently large. Our results also we also showed that the total detection error probability and
the covert rate can be increased by increasing the transmission power when the channel variation
is exploited. This indicates that the multiplicity of users which is scattered in wireless network and
their mobility (channel variation) can be leveraged to hiding the covert message.
5.2 Future Work
For the current work of covert NOMA, one can see from (4.23) the total detection error proba-
bility can be increased if the rate of the non-covert (cover) message is increased or the achievable
rate of the non-covert message at the adversary is decreased. Then, we attempt to provide the
SNR advantage of the non-covert user over the adversary. In this part of thesis, we, therefore,
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present two directions of future work, the Artificial Noise (AN) transmission and the cooperative
transmission in NOMA system.
5.2.1 AN-aided covert NOMA
Motivation: In secrecy, the AN scheme has showed its potential to secure information [67, 76].
The AN is transmitted onto the null space of the channel state information of the intended receiver.
As such, the AN signal can make more noises at the adversary while does not affect the intended
receiver. As a result, the AN can provide the SNR advantage of the intended receiver over the
adversary. Although many studies have investigated the AN into NOMA system [46, 72], no prior
work considers covertness with aid of Artificial Noise in NOMA system. Therefore, we will exploit
the AN scheme in the covert NOMA system.
Observation: Exploiting AN can help degrading the ability of decoding the non-covert message
at Willie while it does not affect the intended receiver of the non-covert message, thus increasing
the total detection error probability. Besides, the AN can also degrade the ability of decoding the
covert message at the covert user. Hence, there should exist an optimal power allocation of AN
power to maximize the covert rate. It also follows from Section 4.3 that Willie can detect the
covert message with probability 1 if Willie can decode the non-covert message where the covert
message is superimposed, i.e. the second and fourth terms in (4.13) are zero. In this extension, we
will propose a novel design of null-space such that Willie does not know the AN power and hence
cannot detect the covert message with probability 1. i.e. the second and fourth terms in (4.13) are
non-zero. This design does not affect the ability of decoding the covert message at the covert user.
Therefore, the AN can help increasing the total detection error probability, thereby the covert rate.
Contribution: In this extension, we will study the AN-aided covert NOMA. We will propose
a new design of AN and determine the optimum power allocation for AN to maximize the covert
rate. We will also characterize the gain of covert rate by having the AN.
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5.2.2 Cooperative covert NOMA
Motivation: Recently, the author in [22, 44] has considered the cooperative transmission
technique in NOMA system. They showed the significant increase of the sum rate by adopting the
cooperative transmission. In secrecy, two types of cooperative transmission, Decode-and-Forward
(DF) and Amplify-and-Forward (AF), have been also considered in secure NOMA system [16, 1].
However, no prior work considers cooperative transmission in covert NOMA, which we name it
cooperative covert NOMA.
Observation: Similar to the covert NOMA, the covert message is superimposed onto the non-
covert message. As the result, the adversary needs to decode the non-covert message in order to
detect the presence of covert signal. Since the cooperative NOMA can provide the SNR advantage
to the receiver of non-covert message over the adversary, it can degrade the ability of decoding the
non-covert message, hence increase the total detection error probability, at the adversary.
Contribution: In this extension, we will study the DF and AF transmission in covert NOMA.
We will describe the optimum detection strategy at the adversary and the optimum message hiding
strategy and optimum relay selection at the transmitter. We will determine the resulting maximum
total detection error probability. We will compare the maximum total detection error probability
and covert rate between DF and AF transmission in cooperative covert NOMA.
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APPENDIX A. ADAPTING RATE AND POWER FOR MAXIMIZING
SECRECY ENERGY EFFICIENCY
Let
g1(P (γ)) = −P (γ), (A.1)
g2(P (γ)) = P (γ)− P ∗(γ), (A.2)
and g3(P (γ)) =
∫ ∞
0
P (γ) f (γ) dγ − 1. (A.3)







ζ(P (γ), γ)f(γ)dγ (A.4)
subject to g1(P (γ)) ≤ 0 (A.5)
g2(P (γ)) ≤ 0 (A.6)
g3(P (γ)) ≤ 0. (A.7)
The Kuhn-Tucker condition for the solution of the optimization problem is given by [13]
λ ≥ 0 (A.8)
vi ≥ 0 (A.9)
λg3(P (γ)) = 0 (A.10)





L(P (γ)) = −
∫ ∞
α
ζ(P (γ), γ)f(γ)dγ + λg3(P (γ)) + v1g1(P (γ)) + v2g2(P (γ)), (A.13)
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f(γ) = v2 − v1. (A.14)
Since ∂2ζ(P (γ), γ)/∂P (γ)2 < 0, ∂ζ(P (γ), γ)/∂P (γ) is a strictly decreasing function of P (γ). In
addition, ∂ζ(P (γ), γ)/∂P (γ) is 0 for P (γ) = P ∗(γ) and is B(γ − α)/(PC ln 2) for P (γ) = 0 from
(2.19). As a result, ∂ζ(P (γ), γ)/∂P (γ) lies in the range [0, B(γ−α)/(PC ln 2)] for P (γ) ∈ [0, P ∗(γ)].
(i) If λ > B(γ − α)/(PC ln 2), then ∂ζ(P (γ), γ)/∂P (γ) < λ for P (γ) ∈ [0, P ∗(γ)]. Hence, it
follows from (A.14) that v1 > v2. Since v2 ≥ 0, we obtain v1 > 0. Therefore, it follows from (A.9)
that g1(P (γ)) = 0. That is, the optimal transmission power, PPR(γ), is 0.
(ii) If 0 ≤ λ ≤ B(γ−α)/(PC ln 2), then v1 = v2. This can be proved by showing that if v1 6= v2,
then λ /∈ [0, B(γ − α)/(PC ln 2)]:
• If v1 > v2, then v1 > 0, hence P (γ) = 0, and ∂ζ(P (γ), γ)/∂P (γ) < λ. The latter follows
from (A.14). Since ∂ζ(P (γ), γ)/∂P (γ) ≤ B(γ − α)/(PC ln 2) for P (γ) ∈ [0, P ∗(γ)], we obtain
λ > B(γ − α)/(PC ln 2).
• If v2 > v1, then v2 > 0, hence P (γ) = P ∗(γ), and ∂ζ(P (γ), γ)/∂P (γ) > λ. The latter follows
from (A.14). Since ∂ζ(P (γ), γ)/∂P (γ) ≥ 0 for P (γ) ∈ [0, P ∗(γ)], we obtain λ < 0. Therefore,
if v1 6= v2, then λ /∈ [0, B(γ − α)/(PC ln 2)].
For v1 = v2, (A.14) reduces to
∂ζ(P (γ), γ)
∂P (γ)
− λ = 0. (A.15)
Since ∂ζ(P (γ), γ)/∂P (γ) is a strictly decreasing function of P (γ), there should exist a unique
solution of (A.15). Let P †(γ) denote the solution of (A.15). Then, the optimal transmission power,
PPR(γ), is P
†(γ) for 0 ≤ λ ≤ B(γ − α)/(PC ln 2).





0 ≤ λ ≤ B(γ − α)/(PC ln 2)




APPENDIX B. COVERT COMMUNICATION UNDER CHANNEL
UNCERTAINTY AND NOISE UNCERTAINTY
B.1 Equation (3.19) derivation














































































B.2 Proof of pseudo-convexity
In this Appendix, we prove the strict pseudo-convexity of ξ(ĝ). We follow the theorem of [14]
that ξ(ĝ) is strictly pseudo-convex if, for any value of λ = λ0 such that dξ(ĝ)/dλ = 0, we have
d2ξ(ĝ)/dλ2 > 0.























































































respectively, where integration by part is applied to derive (B.6).























































































2k/(k!)2 is applied in (B.11). Moreover, since the non-central Chi-square
with 2 degree of freedom is a log-concave function [68], i.e. (ln(fX(x|ĝ)))′′ < 0, (ln(fX(x|ĝ)))′ is a

























where the inequality, e−t ≥ 1 − t, is applied to derive (B.14). It can be obtained from (B.8) and
(B.14) that d2ξ/dλ2|λ=λ0 > 0. Therefore, ξ(ĝ) is the strictly pseudo-convex function of λ.
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B.3 Equation (3.38) derivation
In this Appendix, we derive (3.38).






































































































B.4 Range of interest derivation
In this Appendix, we prove that if λ† ≥ ρσ̂2w, then ξmin < 0.9 for 1.0002 ≤ ρ ≤ 3.16.


















































In (B.23), we applied
∫ b
a e
xdx/x2 ≥ (eb − ea)/b2. From (B.23), we obtain
e
ρ−ρ−1

















































































































is an increasing function























 ≥ 0.1, (B.31)
for 1.0002 ≤ ρ ≤ 3.16. Therefore, ξmin < 0.9 for 1.0002 ≤ ρ ≤ 3.16.
B.5 Equation (3.55) derivation
In this Appendix, we derive (3.55). Since the LHS of (A.15) is an increasing function of λ and








2ε ln(ρ) ≤ 0, (B.32)
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for λ† ≥ σ2gP/(2ε ln(ρ)). Since
∫
exx−1dx ' ex(x−1 + x−2) for x  1 [28], the LHS of (B.32) can
















2ε ln(ρ) − ρσ2gγe
1
ρσ2gγ , (B.34)










2ε ln(ρ) . (B.35)
Applying the Lambert-W function, W−1, on both sides of (B.35) and W−1(−xe−x) = −x for x ≥ 1
[18], we obtain (3.55).
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APPENDIX C. COVERT NON-ORTHOGONAL MULTIPLE ACCESS
C.1 Equation (4.37) derivation



























as L→∞, where (C.2) follows from Γ(n)Γ(n+m) ' n




Let k∗ denote the largest integer such that α
∑k
l=1 γl − γ1 ≤ 0 for all k ≤ k∗. Then,




















































































c) For k∗ < k ≤ L, where α
∑k
l=1 γl−γ1 > 0: it follows from (4.30) that ν(|g|2) < 1/(α
∑k
l=1 γl−
γ1). Since 1 − e−x/σ
2
f < 1 − e−νk(x)/σ
2
f if x < νk(x) or equivalently x < αk and e






























































ξmax → 1 (C.12)
as L→∞.
C.2 Proof of optimum hiding strategy
In this Appendix, we prove that ξmin in (4.55) is maximized when j = 1. It follows from (4.3)
and (4.17) that
Pr(I(vj ; yw,j) < Rj,0||fj |2 ≥ τ)=
Pr(|fj |2 ≥ τ0)
Pr(|fj |2 ≥ τ)
, (C.13)
Pr(I(vj ; yw,j) < Rj,0||fj |2 < τ)=1−
Pr(|fj |2 < τ1)



























and τ1 ≤ τ ≤ τ0. Then, ξmin in (4.55) can be rewritten as
ξmin = min
{
Pr(|fj |2 ≥ τ0)
Pr(|fj |2 ≥ τ)
, 1− Pr(|fj |
2 < τ1)




Let f(x) and F (x) denote the common probability density function (PDF) and cumulative
density function (CDF) of the corresponding un-ordered statistics of |f1|2, ..., |fL|2. Then, the










 [F (x)]L−k[1− F (x)]k, (C.19)
respectively. Then,














































Pr(|fj+1|2≥x)) > 0, i.e.
Pr(|fj |2≥x)
Pr(|fj+1|2≥x) is an increasing function of x. Hence, we have






for τ0 ≥ τ , or equivalently,
Pr(|fj |2 ≥ τ0)







Pr(|fj |2≥τ) is a decreasing function of j for τ ≤ τ0. Therefore,
Pr(|fj |2≥τ0)
Pr(|fj |2≥τ) is maximized
when j = 1.
b) Similarly, it can be proved that
Pr(|fj |2<x)
Pr(|fj+1|2<x) is an increasing function of x. Then,
Pr(|fj |2<τ)
Pr(|fj |2<τ1)
is a decreasing function of j for τ ≥ τ1. Therefore, Pr(|fj |
2<τ)
Pr(|fj |2<τ1) is maximized when j = 1.
By (C.17), a) and b), ξmin is maximized when j = 1.
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C.3 Equations (4.58)-(4.63) derivation
In this Appendix, we provide the proof of (4.58)-(4.63).



















, |g|2 ≥ |f1|2
















, |g|2 < |f1|2
∣∣∣∣|f1|2 ≥ τ) = 0. (C.26)
Also since Bob can decode and remove v2, ...,vL if |g|2 ≥ |f1|2, we obtain Dc1 = {1}. Hence, it
follows from (C.25) and (C.26) that
ξ0 =1− Pr(|f1|2 ≤ |g|2| |f1|2 ≥ τ) (C.27)




















































1 + |g|2(1− α)γ1
∣∣∣∣|f1|2 < τ). (C.31)
If τ > α(1−α)γ1 , then
|g|2α
1+|g|2(1−α)γ1 < τ for all |g|


















However, if τ ≤ α(1−α)γ1 , then
|g|2α
1+|g|2(1−α)γ1 ≤ τ for |g|
2 ≤ a1, where a1 = τα−(1−α)γ1τ , and
|g|2α
1+|g|2(1−α)γ1 > τ for |g|




















C.4 Equation (4.64) derivation
In this Appendix, we provide the proof of (4.64).





























as L→∞. Also, (1− e−τ/σ
2
f )L → 0 as L→∞. Therefore, ξ0 in (4.59) converges to 1 as L→∞.






















as L→∞ for τ > α/((1− α)γ1). Therefore, ξ1 in (4.62) converges to 1 as L→∞.
By a) and b), ξmax = min{ξ0, ξ1} converges to 1 as L increases for τ > α/((1− α)γ1).
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C.5 Equation (4.67) derivation










|h|2 ≥ µ1, |f2|2 ≤ |h|2,
|h|2α










|h|2 ≥ µ1, |f2|2 ≤ |h|2,
|h|2α





|h|2 ≥ µ1, |f2|2 ≤ |h|2,
|h|2α
1 + |h|2(1− α)γ1




|h|2 ≥ µ1, |f2|2 ≤ |h|2,
|h|2α
1 + |h|2(1− α)γ1
< |f1|2, |f1|2 > |h|2





1 + |h|2(1− α)γ1




|h|2 ≥ µ1, |f2|2 ≤ |h|2 < |f1|2













1 + |h|2(1− α)γ1





















































1 + |h|2(1− α)γ1

























































c) For 1 ≤ k ≤ L,



































By (C.42), a), b) and c), we obtain (4.67).
C.6 Equation (4.78) derivation
In this Appendix, we provide the proof of (4.78). It follows from (4.77) that
















, LM + 1
)
. (C.49)
b) 1 ≤ k ≤ L, i.e. Willie can decode vk+1, ...,vL or Dc1 = {1, ..., k}: For given |f1,1|2 = t, the
corresponding un-ordered random variables of the order statistics, |f1,l|2, l = 1, ..., L, are i.i.d and
have the common CDF of






for 0 ≤ x ≤ t. Since the probability density function (PDF) of |f1,1|2 is
f|f1,1|2(t) = LM(1− e
−x/σ2f )LM−1e−x/σ
2
f /σ2f , (C.51)
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it follows from (C.50) and (C.51) that








































f by y and applying the binomial expansion,
(










 yl (1− e− xσ2f )L(M−1)−l , (C.55)
into (C.54) yield








































(1− e− xσ2f)LM−k−l(e− xσ2f − e− νk(x)σ2f )k+l . (C.58)
Therefore, we obtain from (C.58) that































By a) and b), we obtain (4.78).
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C.7 Equation (4.79) derivation
In this Appendix, we provide the proof of (4.79). The decoding outage probability can be




Pr(|hm|2 ≥ µk, |f1,k+1|2 ≤ |hm|2 < |f1,k|2). (C.60)
a) k = 0:






















, LM + 1
)
. (C.62)
b) k > 0:



















































f ; k + l +
σ2f
σ2h
, LM − k − l + 1
)
, (C.65)
where (C.64) is derived from (C.58) where νk(x) =∞.
By a) and b), we obtain (4.79).
C.8 Equation (4.80) derivation
In this Appendix, we provide the proof of (4.80). Similar Appendix C.5, replacing |h|2 by |hm|2












1 + |h|2(1− α)γ1





Pr(|h|2 ≥ µk, |f1,k+1|2 ≤ |h|2 < |f1,k|2||f1,1|2 < τ). (C.66)
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a) The second and third terms of (C.66) can be obtained from (C.44) and (C.46), respectively,
with L replaced by LM .
b) The fourth term of (C.66) is given by
























































which is derived from (C.58) where νk(x) = τ .
By a) and b), we obtain (4.80).
